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ECO-PATENT COMMONS: A DONATION APPROACH
ENCOURAGING INNOVATION WITHIN THE PATENT
SYSTEM
ANDREW BOYNTON*
INTRODUCTION
On September 21, 2009, President Barack Obama addressed the
Hudson Valley Community College to encourage students to “shape a
brighter future through hard work and innovation.”1 The President’s clear
message was that in order for the United States to overcome “economic
crisis,” the country “must invest in education, infrastructure and research.”2
The President outlined a strategy for economic growth that includes invest-
ing in research, infrastructure, and green technologies.3 The President’s
strategy identifies the energy infrastructure and industry as two areas
where innovation is needed to improve the United States’ economic future.4
The strategy also identifies intellectual property as an area that requires
protection in order to promote innovation.5 This note will examine the
role of the Eco-Patent Commons in promoting innovation in industry
through an innovative idea about use, disclosure, and cooperation within
the typically exclusive framework of patent law.
Industry and technology undoubtedly affect the environment
through consumption and waste.6 Industry uses raw materials and energy
in production, and outputs waste in the form of products and byproducts
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, William & Mary School of Law; B.S. Chemistry, The College of
William & Mary, 2001. I would like to thank the staff and Board of the William & Mary
Environmental Law and Policy Review for their hard work in publishing this note and
volume. I would also like to thank my family, especially my wife Lauren for her constant
support and encouragement, and my buddy Jalen, for not caring at all about school, only
play-time.
1 Obama Touts Efforts to Help Economy, Colleges, MSNBC.COM, http://www.msnbc.msn
.com/id/32953632/ns/politics-white_house/ (last updated Sept. 21, 2009).
2 Id.
3 NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL & OFFICE OF SCI. AND TECH. POLICY, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, A STRATEGY FOR AMERICAN INNOVATION: DRIVING TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE
GROWTH AND QUALITY JOBS i–ii (Sept. 2009).
4 Id. at 12.
5 Id. at 15.
6 See Michael A. Gollin, Using Intellectual Property to Improve Environmental Protection,
4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 193, 193 (1991).
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from their processes.7 Industrial users may not have an incentive to im-
prove the efficiency of energy or material use because of high transaction
costs,8 or the external nature of some environmental issues.9 As identified
by the President’s white paper, intellectual property rights provide an
important part of the answer to the problem of incentivizing innovation
in the industrial setting.10
The Constitution gives Congress the power to grant intellectual
property rights through patents, in order “[t]o promote the [p]rogress of
[s]cience and useful [a]rts . . . .”11 A patent is a property right of exclusion
for a period of 20 years.12 The purpose of the patent system is to promote
innovation and disclosure of inventions while protecting the investment
in research of the individual or company.13 In the context of environmental
innovation, patent rights may not confer enough benefit to overcome
specific issues such as the high cost of obtaining and protecting patents,14
exclusivity problems such as suppression15 or patent trolls,16 and problems
with the notice or disclosure function of patents.17 Industry may seek
solutions to these issues through other ideas about intellectual property.
Some of those other intellectual property ideas that may solve
problems with patents in promoting innovation include commons, Eco-
Patent Commons, patent pools, and trade secrets. Common resources may
decrease transaction costs but offer no protection to the inventor for their
investment.18 Trade secrets protect the inventor by preventing disclosure,
7 See id. at 196–97.
8 See Benjamin K. Sovacool, Placing a Glove on The Invisible Hand: How Intellectual
Property Rights May Impede Innovation in Energy Research and Development (R&D), 18
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 381, 397 (2008).
9 See Marilyn A. Brown, Market Failures and Barriers as a Basis for Clean Energy Policies,
29 ENERGY POL’Y 1197, 1201–02 (2001).
10 See NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL & OFFICE OF SCI. AND TECH. POLICY, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, supra note 3, at 15.
11 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
12 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, General Information Concerning Patents, http://
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/general/ (last modified Sept. 9, 2008).
13 See Natalie M. Derzko, Using Intellectual Property Law and Regulatory Processes to
Foster the Innovation and Diffusion of Environmental Technologies, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 3, 9–10 (1996).
14 See Sovacool, supra note 8, at 405, 436.
15 See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 159–60 (2008).
16 See Patent Thickets, Bad Patents, and Costly Patent Litigation, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY,
(May 6, 2009, 11:56 PM), http://volokh.com/author/guestblogger/.
17 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 15, at 147.
18 Commons refers to the open access to intellectual property in this case. See generally
Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management,
89 MINN. L. REV. 917 (2005).
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but they do not function to incentivize innovation,19 and may be difficult to
protect in the environmental context.20 Patent pools also reduce transaction
costs and increase the use of technology, but they are generally limited to
a certain industry, where environmental problems may overlap between
industries.21 Eco-Patent Commons is the best of the four alternatives be-
cause it works within the patent system to increase disclosure after technol-
ogy has been patented and its structure will help affect more industries.22
On January 14, 2008, IBM, Nokia, Sony, and Pitney Bowes an-
nounced the formation of the Eco-Patent Commons.23 The Commons is
“an initiative to create a collection of patents that directly or indirectly
protect the environment.”24 Members give the patents to the Commons
and pledge not to enforce their rights against anyone who chooses to use
the patents.25 The objective of the Commons is to promote innovation and
cooperation in the search to protect the environment.26 The Eco-Patent
Commons addresses problems arising between patent protection and
environmental innovation by working within the patent system to promote
disclosure, cooperation, and wide adoption, a significant niche that the
other alternate forms of intellectual property do not provide.27
This note will discuss the unique position the Eco-Patent Commons
presents in promoting environmental innovation. In Part I, the note will
examine the role of industry in causing and solving environmental prob-
lems and the obstacles that industry faces in increasing environmental
efficiency. In Part II, the note will turn to the United States patent system
19 See Gregory N. Mandel, Promoting Environmental Innovation with Intellectual Property
Innovation: A New Basis for Patent Rewards, 24 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 51,
53–54 (2005).
20 Gollin, supra note 6, at 203.
21 See Steven Seidenberg, Patent Giveaway, INSIDE COUNSEL, April 1, 2009, at 26, available
at 2009 WLNR 21858452; see generally Bart Showalter & Trampas Kurth, New Uses for
Patent Pools, INTELLECTUAL PROP. TODAY, Sept. 2008, at 22, available at http://www.ip
today.com/articles/2008-9-showalter.asp.
22 See generally WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., THE ECO-PATENT COMMONS:
A LEADERSHIP OPPORTUNITY FOR GLOBAL BUSINESS TO PROTECT THE PLANET 1–2 (June
2010), available at http://www.wbcsd.org/web/projects/ecopatent/Eco_patent_Updated
June2010.pdf [hereinafter ECO-PATENT COMMONS: A LEADERSHIP OPPORTUNITY] (analyzing
the benefits of Eco-Patent Commons).
23 Martin LaMonica, Eco-Patent Commons Shares Earth-Friendly Tech, CNET NEWS,
(Jan.13, 2008), http://news.cnet.com/Eco-Patent-Commons-shares-earth-friendly-tech/
2100-13844_3-6225735.html.
24 ECO-PATENT COMMONS: A LEADERSHIP OPPORTUNITY, supra note 22, at 1.
25 See id. at 1–2.
26 Id. at 2.
27 See infra Part IV.
662 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 35:659
and its purpose of promoting innovation, then examine obstacles to innova-
tion that industry and the patent system share. In Part III, the note will
delve into other ideas about intellectual property and whether those forms
address the problems with promoting industrial innovation shared by
industry and the patent system. The final part of the note will make the
case that Eco-Patent Commons is a uniquely positioned idea about the use
of intellectual property that works within the patent system to help address
economic problems industry faces with adopting environmental innovation.
I. INDUSTRY’S ROLE IN A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE
Industry occupies a unique position in environmental issues because
of the tension between its contribution to the harm of the environment and
its role in reducing the use of resources and pollution.28 For instance,
General Electric, an energy producer, keeps performance metric data on
various aspects of the company’s contribution to environmental issues like
water use, waste generation, and greenhouse gas emissions.29 Implicit in
keeping and reporting those statistics is GE’s desire to im-prove its environ-
mental impact by reducing greenhouse gas emissions and water use, and
general efficiency.30 Industrial users may recognize their unique place in
affecting and preventing industrial harm, but with that unique position
comes unique problems.
Industry may solve environmental issues, but they are also uniquely
responsible for those issues.31 Industry impacts the environment through-
out the “ ‘life-cycle’ of consumer goods and services.”32 This cycle begins with
the production and use of raw materials.33 The cycle continues with the use
of energy in manufacturing, and “the transport of the pollutants caused
by the process, or the transport of the product itself.”34 The final impacts
28 See Gollin, supra note 6, at 193.
29 GENERAL ELECTRIC, METRICS, http://www.ge.com/citizenship/metrics/environment-health
-safety-data.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2011).
30 See GENERAL ELECTRIC, ENVIRONMENT, http://www.ge.com/citizenship/our-priorities/
environment/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2009).
31 See Gollin, supra note 6, at 193.
32 See Carolyn Abbot & David Booton, Using Patent Law’s Teaching Function to Introduce
an Environmental Ethic into the Process of Technical Innovation, 21 GEO. INT’L ENVTL.
L. REV. 219, 219 (2009).
33 Id.
34 Victor B. Flatt, The Greening of the Corporation: Symposium Article: Act Locally, Affect
Globally: How Changing Social Norms to Influence the Private Sector Shows a Path to
Using Local Government to Control Environmental Harms, 35 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
455, 458 (2008).
2011] ECO-PATENT COMMONS 663
from production are the pollution and waste generated from industrial
processes, as well as the products themselves.35 Industrial innovation can
have a large, harmful environmental impact throughout the production
process, giving ample opportunity for improvement of those processes and
improvement with more efficient material or energy use.36
While it is easy to identify the sources of negative environmental
impact, industry faces problems in improving environmental innovation.
The first issue is the high cost of innovation.37 Green innovation is associ-
ated with high cost in industrial applications because it requires large-scale
capital investment.38 This investment can come in the form of installing
existing technology,39 or developing new technology through innovation.40
Because green technology is a public good, the investor may have little
incentive to innovate if it is difficult to recover costs or the innovation is
likely to lead to pirating.41 Because of the barrier of cost to innovation, “the
government, society, and the economy should encourage more innovation
by increasing incentives,” otherwise innovation may not take place.42
The second problem that industry faces is the externality of many
environmental concerns. An externality exists when the market, rather
than a producer, is responsible for the cost of a problem.43 Studies have
indicated that factors of industrial production like greenhouse gas emis-
sions and air, water, and land pollution are unpriced externalities that may
not factor into a business’s decision to adopt environmentally efficient tech-
nology.44 Other externalities include recycling and waste disposal.45 The
failure to include externalities into a business’s decision to adopt green
35 See Gollin, supra note 6, at 196 (discussing that environmental technology not only
minimizes “resource consumption and waste production” but also affects recycling and
products’ life-cycle).
36 See Gollin, supra note 6, at 193.
37 See Daniel Gross, The Real “Green” Innovation, SLATE.COM (April 16, 2009, 6:57 AM),
http://www.slate.com/id/2216129/.
38 See id.
39 See id.
40 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY INVENTIONS & INNOVATION PROGRAM, FROM
INVENTION TO INNOVATION: COMMERCIALIZATION OF NEW TECHNOLOGY BY INDEPENDENT
AND SMALL BUSINESS INVENTORS (1999) (discussing the necessity of sufficient capital to
achieve a successful development of new product through innovation).
41 See Derzko, supra note 13, at 8.
42 Id.
43 See Andrea Santoriello & Walter Block, Externalities and the Environment, 46 THE
FREEMAN 755, 755 (1996).
44 See Brown, supra note 9, at 1198–1200.
45 See Santoriello & Block, supra note 43, at 755.
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technology makes the use of resources like fossil fuels less efficient in
general.46 The external nature of benefits from environmental innovation
creates problems with incentivizing environmentally responsible behavior
by industry.47 Generally, the business will not factor in the external benefit
“society reaps from the innovation in the form of improved environmental
conditions, but only accounts for the benefit that the firm itself receives.”48
Because externalities are virtually free when the market or government
bears the price,49 the business has little incentive to adopt green technolo-
gies to limit externalities unless there is pressure or an incentive elsewhere
for the business to account for the costs.50
The solutions for the dual problems plaguing promotion of environ-
mental innovation should address the cost issue as well as the issue of un-
priced externality or benefits, but this will be difficult.51 One proposed
method of encouraging innovation is through the use of “command-and-
control” regulatory schemes like the Clean Air Act or the Clean Water Act
to “utilize either technology standards or performance standards to control
pollution.”52 The Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act were “enacted to
abate pollution by forcing industries to develop and utilize the latest
pollution abatement technologies.”53 This sort of command-and-control
legislation has been criticized as offering little to no incentive for innovation
because they fail to effectively address the external nature of environmental
benefit.54 While command-and-control may fail to address the externality
problem,55 any solution to the dual problems will likely require cooperation
to address the public good aspect of the innovation problem.56 Overcoming
46 See Brown, supra note 9, at 1202.
47 See Mandel, supra note 19, at 58.
48 Id.
49 See generally Bryan Caplan, Externalities, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS,
http://www.econlib.org/library/enc/externalities.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2011).
50 See Mandel, supra note 19, at 58; see also Derzko, supra note 13, at 18–19 (discussing
command-and-control approaches to regulating air pollution as an externality).
51 See Mandel, supra note 19, at 58. Mandel calls these dual concerns “the invention market
failure and the positive environmental externality market failure.” Id.
52 See Derzko, supra note 13, at 18.
53 Id. at 19.
54 Id. at 20 (noting the polluting firm is not encouraged to innovate because their failure
to develop new technology is rewarded by keeping environmental standards low).
55 Id.
56 Because the problem of externalities is in many ways a public goods problem, whatever
solutions, with respect to energy or resource use, need to apply to diverse end users, which
requires collaboration. See Katherine J. Strandburg, Evolving Innovation Paradigms and
the Global Intellectual Property Regime, 41 CONN. L. REV. 861, 878–81 (2009).
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the public good problem will require the wide adoption of innovative solu-
tions.57 The goal of patent law is to address the cost aspect by “by bring-
ing the private benefits of invention more in line with their social value”
through the protection of monopoly pricing on useful and novel inventions.58
II. PATENTS’ ROLE IN INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION
A. Background and Purposes of the Patent Grant
In order to show the role of patents in encouraging innovation in
green technology, this note turns to the background and purpose of patents
in the United States. The right of the federal government to grant patents
is found in the Constitution.59 The purpose of this grant is “[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . .”60 Congress can promote
progress “by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the ex-
clusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”61 The grant
of the patent is the right of exclusion from “making, using, selling, offering
for sale, or importing the patented subject matter during the patent’s
term.”62 In an analogy from real property law, the patent’s grant is a neg-
ative right to exclude and not the “full ‘bundle of sticks.’ ”63 There is no re-
quirement that the patentee must practice or use the patented material in
exchange for the grant of the right to exclude.64 There is also no require-
ment that the patentee license the invention.65 There is no guarantee that
patentees will even be able to practice their own patent.66 The monopoly
of the patent term begins when the patent issues and lasts twenty years
from the date that the “application for the patent was filed.”67 The monopoly
57 See Deborah Behles, The New Race: Speeding Up Climate Change Innovation, 11 N.C.
J.L. & TECH. 1, 5 (2009).
58 See Mandel, supra note 19, at 57.
59 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. “Writings” are protected under copyright law and
“[d]iscoveries” under patent law. See also 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (outlining the subject
matter of copyright law); 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (explaining what inventions are patentable).
60 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
61 Id.
62 Mandel, supra note 19, at 54 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2005)).
63 Aleksandar Nikolic, Securitization of Patents and Its Continued Viability in Light of
the Current Economic Conditions, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 393, 395–96 (2009).
64 See Abbot & Booton, supra note 32, at 229.
65 Paul Gormley, Compulsory Patent Licenses and Environmental Protection, 7 TUL. ENVTL.
L.J. 131, 134 (1993).
66 Id. There is only the right to exclude from the patent grant.
67 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
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is granted in order to induce inventors “to invest time, financial resources,
and effort into research and development in order to innovate.”68
The government requires that “an inventor disclose[s] to the world
what their new invention is and how it works in exchange for the right to
exclude others from practicing the invention for a certain period of time.”69
In order to obtain a patent, the inventor must submit an application to the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) that meets certain
requirements.70 The inventor must show through the application that “the
invention is new, useful, and non-obvious.”71 The types of inventions that
are patentable are restricted to “any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improve-
ment thereof . . . ,”72 which is a “very minor hurdle to environmental inno-
vation patenting.”73 Usefulness, or utility, requires that the “invention will
do what the inventor claims it does, and that what the invention does is
useful.”74 The patent must be new, or novel, which requires that “it has not
been previously patented, published, known or used by others.”75 The in-
vention must also be non-obvious, which is determined by whether “the
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the inven-
tion was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the
subject matter pertains.”76 If a patent application meets these standards,
then a patent will be issued on the application.77 The standards for re-
ceiving a patent probably do not provide much of a barrier when it comes
to environmental innovations.78 In fact, there is a statutory allowance for
an expedited examination of the patent application if the invention materi-
ally “enhance[s] the quality of the environment.”79
68 Mandel, supra note 19, at 54.
69 See id.
70 Gollin, supra note 6, at 210. The patent application process is known as patent
prosecution. Id.
71 Derzko, supra note 13, at 10.
72 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
73 Mandel, supra note 19, at 55 (“A new manufacturing process that produces less pollution
as well as a new remediation product both are patent-eligible.”).
74 Id. (citing DONALD S. CHISUM, 1 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 4.01 (2003)).
75 Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006)).
76 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006).
77 See Gollin, supra note 6, at 210.
78 See Mandel, supra note 19, at 56 (“An invention that lowers pollution production,
improves remediation efficiency, or achieves better conservation in a new and non-obvious
way can meet the patent validity requirements.”).
79 37 C.F.R. § 1.102(c) (2004).
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In return for the patent monopoly, the government requires that
the inventor disclose the invention in the patent application.80 The disclo-
sure requirement is very important to encouraging innovation because “[i]t
ensures the diffusion of valuable information to members of the public.”81
The patent must include a specification that contains a “written descrip-
tion of the invention” in “such full, clear, concise, and exact terms” that
will “enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to perform the claimed in-
vention without undue experimentation.”82 The specification is also re-
quired to contain the “best mode” for “carrying out” the invention, so long
as the inventor is aware of the “best mode” at the time of filing the appli-
cation.83 The disclosure requirement of patents works to encourage inno-
vation by balancing the grant of the patent monopoly with the increase in
public knowledge available from the disclosure of patents.84
With the grant of the patent, the patentee has the right to protect
that grant through exclusion.85 In suing against infringement, patentees
can obtain injunctions against the infringer86 and recover reasonable
royalties and lost profits.87 Furthermore, damages may be tripled88 and
attorney’s fees may be possible.89
A patentee may also profit for their patent through licenses or
sales.90 A patentee licenses the use of the invention through bargained for
consideration.91 Licenses can be granted exclusively or nonexclusively,92
80 Derzko, supra note 13, at 9 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1998) and discussing the value of
public dissemination).
81 Id. (“Once disseminated, these inventions will be relied upon by other inventors to create
yet other inventions.”).
82 Abbot & Booton, supra note 32, at 234 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006)).
83 Id. at 235–36. “Best mode” is a further disclosure requirement that “demands, in the
public interest, that applicants disclose information going beyond the scope of what is being
claimed. Typically it requires the disclosure of information, such as ‘know-how,’ that might
otherwise be kept secret.” Id.
84 See Derzko, supra note 13, at 9.
85 See Gollin, supra note 6, at 209 n.84 (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses or sells
any patented invention, within the United States during the term of the patent therefor,
infringes the patent.”) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006)). Patentees can sue for direct infringe-
ment, inducement to infringe, and contributory infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)–(c) (2006).
86 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006).
87 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
88 Id. (noting that the court may, in some circumstances, triple the damages that the jury
or the court finds or assesses).
89 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006) (noting that attorney’s fees may be awarded to the prevailing
party, but only in “exceptional cases”).
90 See Derzko, supra note 13, at 9.
91 See id. at 43.
92 See Gollin, supra note 6, at 217.
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and are generally governed by contract law.93 Licenses for environmental
processes may not offer the most cost benefit to the company,94 so valuing
a license “requires analysis of the licensor’s investment, prospective benefits
from not licensing, and the licensee’s potential profit.”95 However, sale of
the invention may be preferable to a license “when the person seeking the
technology needs only a machine, rather than a plant or a system.”96 When
the patentee sells the invention, “[t]he patent owner’s rights with respect
to the product end with its sale.”97 The patentee may still restrict sales of
the invention by contract at the time of sale.98
The purposes of the quid pro quo of the patent monopoly grant are
to encourage invention and encourage public disclosure.99 As the previous
discussion has shown, patents encourage invention and innovation by
offering a monopoly on the invention or improvement,100 which allows
“inventors to make profits and recoup research expenses and development
costs.”101 In exchange for the monopoly, the applicant must make an appli-
cation that clearly states the invention.102 Without the monopoly incen-
tive, the inventor may not disclose or sell the invention for fear of loss of
economic value.103 Lack of disclosure might cause “inefficient, duplicative
93 McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67 F.3d 917, 920 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“Whether express
or implied, a license is a contract ‘governed by ordinary principles of state contract law.’ ”
(quoting Power Lift, Inc. v. Weatherford Nipple-Up Sys., Inc., 871 F.2d 1082, 1085 (Fed.
Cir. 1989)).
94 See Gollin, supra note 6, at 217 (noting that the methods employed by patent owners
in using their licenses could be either beneficial or detrimental).
95 See id. at 218–19. A patent owner, therefore, may decide that it is more beneficial to use
the invention and deprive the competition of its advantages rather than licensing to the
competitor and losing the advantage of lower operating costs. See also Gormley, supra note
65, at 135 (“[T]he long term gains of securing a greater market share, or even of driving
a competitor out of business, might well be of far greater benefit to the patent holder.”).
96 See Gormley, supra note 65, at 218.
97 Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Tech., 995 F.2d 1566, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[a] purchaser of
such a product may use or resell the product free of the patent.”).
98 See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (noting that
if the sale of a device was validly conditioned under a law governing sales, and the “restric-
tion on reuse was within the scope of the patent grant or otherwise justified, then violation
of the restriction may be remedied by action for patent infringement”).
99 See David G. Scalise & Daniel Nugent, International Intellectual Property Protections
for Living Matter: Biotechnology, Multinational Conventions and the Exception for
Agriculture, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 83, 86–87 (1995).
100 See id. at 89.
101 Lara E. Ewens, Seed Wars: Biotechnology, Intellectual Property, and the Quest for High
Yield Seeds, 23 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 285, 291 (2000).
102 35 U.S.C. § 112.
103 See Scalise & Nugent, supra note 99, at 87.
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research and a reluctance to share ideas,” stifling innovation.104 However,
eighteen months after the inventor files the application, the USPTO pub-
lishes the patent.105 Once a patent is issued, it can be searched on the
USPTO website.106 After the twenty-year patent term ends, the invention
enters the public domain.107 The disclosure of information in the patent
process aims to encourage the dissemination of new technology and inno-
vative use of old and new ideas.108
B. The Patent Monopoly and Problems with Innovation
Measuring the actual effects of patents on inducing innovation is
beyond the scope of this note. The note instead turns to comparing the
purposes of the patent monopoly with the obstacles that may prevent com-
panies from investing in environmental innovation. The monetary protec-
tion of the patent monopoly by infringement suits, licenses, and sales may
not be enough incentive to induce environmental innovation. In addition
to the possible monetary benefit of a monopoly on the patented invention,
obtaining and defending patents entails large costs.109 Filing for a patent
may include “conducting a pre-application patent search, review of the
product’s patentability, preparation of formal drawings, filing fees with
the USPTO, and patent attorney fees.”110 The cost of filing a patent may
range from tens of thousands of dollars to hundreds of thousands of dol-
lars, without factoring in “costs associated with patent continuation, main-
tenance, and enforcement against infringement.”111 Once the patent is
obtained, patent defense presents large costs to the inventor and possible
infringers.112 A typical patent infringement suit may cost millions of dollars
for patentee and defendant alike.113 Not only does litigation cost money
104 Id.
105 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2006). Once the patent is published, it becomes prior art for sub-
sequent patent applications, unless the subsequent application was invented before the
filing of the published application. See also Takeda Pharm. Co. Ltd. v. Doll, 561 F.3d
1372,1379 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Schall, J., concurring) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (2006)).
106 U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Full-Text and Full-Page Image Databases,
http://patft.uspto.gov/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2011). See also Google Patents, http://www
.google.com/patents (last visited Jan. 26, 2011) (Google Patents allows for searching of
over seven million patents from the USPTO database).
107 See Scalise & Nugent, supra note 99, at 87.
108 Abbot & Booton, supra note 32, at 232.
109 See Sovacool, supra note 8, at 397, 405–06.
110 Id. at 397.
111 Id. at 398.
112 See id. at 405–06.
113 Id.
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when there is an actual dispute,114 many companies are dissuaded from
innovation “by the prospect of patent litigation,” and evidence suggests
that this may affect smaller companies more than larger companies.115
This problem may be particularly pronounced with environmental innova-
tion because of high investment costs when compared to a long window of
recoupment of investment.116
The second obstacle patent law presents to environmental innova-
tion comes from the grant of the patent monopoly and the ability of the
patentee to exclude. Some companies patent methods or devices that they
never intend on using, but instead use those patents to sue for infringement
solely for monetary gain.117 This can take the form of patent trolls,118 or
submarine patents, where “an inventor or firm files an application with
broad or incomplete claims, and then files continuing applications to keep
the patent submerged in the patent office.”119 When someone uses the
patented idea, the applicant allows the application to issue and then asks
for a license or sues for infringement.120 Once the patents are enforced,
this practice functions as a “tax on innovation,” which can multiply in a
complex industry.121
Other patentees suppress their own patents.122 Patent suppression
takes place when a firm refuses to practice their own patent in order to
prevent the use of technology that “could displace established markets or
reduce profit margins.”123 This has a direct effect on innovation because
businesses have a financial incentive to suppress “technology if it threatens
to disrupt profits in a market,”124 already one of the concerns preventing
114 See id. at 405–06 (arguing that actual infringement cases can be costly, even if the firm
loses an infringement case).
115 See Sovacool, supra note 8, at 406.
116 See id. at 402 (“The vast bulk of industry will not invest in energy plants unless they
are ‘broken’ or, in the best case, when an energy efficiency project will pay back the capital
investment in 12 to 18 months.”).
117 See id. at 414. The practice is known as warehousing patents. Id.
118 Some qualify the suit of NTP against RIM, the maker of the Blackberry, as “patent troll”
behavior, but the definition is unclear. See Patent Thickets, Bad Patents, and Costly Patent
Litigation, supra note 16.
119 See Sovacool, supra note 8, at 414.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 415.
122 See id. at 417.
123 Id. (quoting Charles Allen Black, The Cure for Deadly Patent Practices: Preventing
Technology Suppression and Patent Shelving in the Life Sciences, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH.
397, 401 (2004)).
124 Id. at 417.
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environmental innovation.125 Finally, the right to exclude itself may be a
detriment to environmental innovation because many innovations may
need to be implemented widely and quickly to have a legitimate effect.126
The third problem that patent rights present to environmental
innovation is that the notice function of patents is not working properly.127
The notice function of patents, through patent disclosure, is intended to
promote public knowledge, but also to delineate the property right of the
patentee.128 Increased patent litigation and a decline in patent quality in-
dicate that the notice function of patent law has failed to properly delineate
the property right of the patentee.129 Increased litigation adds to transac-
tion costs, already an impediment to environmental innovation.130
The cost of obtaining and protecting patent rights is high.131 Both
warehousing and patent suppression are anti-competitive practices that
impede environmental innovation.132 When the notice function of patents
fails, a further impediment to environmental innovation arises.133 This note
now turns to other concepts within and outside patent law that might ame-
liorate impediments to environmental innovation from industry and the
patent law system.
III. ALTERNATIVES TO PATENT PROTECTION TO ENCOURAGE GREEN
INNOVATION
Both industry and patent law have inherent problems to overcome
in order to more efficiently promote green innovation.134 These problems
include high transactions costs, the externality of many environmental
problems associated with exclusivity of patents, and problems with the
notice function of patents.135 This note turns to other ideas within intellec-
tual property law that might also promote green innovation by addressing
the problems with industry and patent law.
125 See Behles, supra note 57, at 29 (highlighting concerns about “suppression” within the
climate change arena).
126 See id.
127 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 15, at 18–19.
128 Id. at 8–9.
129 See id. at 18–19.
130 See Sovacool, supra note 8, at 413.
131 Id. at 397, 405–06.
132 Id. at 414–17.
133 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 15, at 18–19.
134 See supra Parts I–II.
135 See id.
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A. Commons
The first theory that might address problems of industry and patent
law in promoting green innovation is the idea of the commons. The com-
mons can be defined as both open use and open access to resources.136
Resources can be inherently common or made common by an inventor.137
Adopting a wide definition of the commons encompasses both the idea of
common ownership of resources and open access to resources.138 The wide
definition is important in the computer age, because many resources like
computer programs are intangible and cannot be exhausted, but are still
discussed under the rubric of the commons.139 In the context of this note,
although concerned with efficient use of resources, the commons refers to
intangible intellectual property resources that help to spur green innova-
tion.140 Because the commons is defined as open access to that intangible
intellectual property, it can be seen as a distinct dichotomy from the ex-
clusive protection of a patent.141 Even though access is open, there can be
a disparity in ability to exploit the common resource based on “knowledge,
wealth, power, and ability,” creating distributional consequences of the
common resource.142
The first issue that a commons approach to intellectual property
must address in promoting green innovation is the high cost to industry
and the cost of protecting intellectual property. Granting environmentally
useful intellectual property to the public domain would help to alleviate
the transaction costs of filing a patent, licensing, and litigation because
the commons is inherently non-exclusive.143 Even if the intellectual prop-
erty is given to the public domain and transaction costs associated with
patent protection are removed, it is unlikely that the commons would spur
136 Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CALIF. L.
REV. 1331, 1338 (2004).
137 See Frischmann, supra note 18, at 936.
138 See Chander & Sunder, supra note 136, at 1338.
139 See id. at 1337. The greatest fear with the commons is overuse of the common resource.
See id. at 1332. When the resource cannot be exhausted, this fear is somewhat allayed. See
id. at 1337.
140 It is interesting to note that public domain movements like Creative Commons are
modeled after the environmental movement. Id. at 1333–34. “We must protect the public
domain, they argue, because it facilitates free speech and free access while at the same
time sustaining innovation.” Id. at 1334.
141 See Chander & Sunder, supra note 136, at 1339 (“Private property and the public domain
are paired together in a perpetual dance.”).
142 See id. at 1341–42.
143 See id. at 1338. No exclusion is needed if there is open access to the resource.
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innovation in order to overcome the high costs associated with implemen-
tation of green innovation.144 Furthermore, because the resources are in-
tangible intellectual property, they may also suffer from the problem of
free-riders that may dissuade companies from investing in innovation.145
While the idea of the commons may easily remove the cost of protection
and exclusion once an invention is made, it is unclear whether this reduc-
tion in cost will spur innovation despite the costs inherent in researching
and implementing new technology.
The next issue that a commons approach needs to address is the
notice and disclosure problem with patents. Whether intellectual property
will be disclosed as part of the commons depends on the nature of the in-
vention and the decision of the inventor on how to manage the resource.146
Some disclosure is necessary for selling or using the invention for financial
benefit.147 If we presume that the industrial inventor discloses the invention
to the public that is able to exploit the invention, this disclosure should pro-
mote public knowledge as well as delineate the property right the inventor
is donating to the public domain.148 However, if the inventor decides not
to donate the invention to the public domain while not seeking protection
in other areas of intellectual property law, then there is limited benefit to
public knowledge based on similar notions of patent disclosure.149
The last issue that a commons approach must address in order to
encourage industrial innovation is the exclusivity problems inherent with
patent protection.150 While private property and the public domain are
not necessarily a dichotomy,151 they are hard to reconcile because green
144 See id. at 1334. This argument for innovation relies on open access to encourage utiliza-
tion of knowledge resources, while the cost problems associated with implementation from
Part I are monetary and tangible resource issues. Whether open access would encourage
innovation by overcoming the cost issues of Part I is beyond the scope of this note.
145 See Frischmann, supra note 18, at 938, 946–47 (stating that free-riders may undercut
the original inventor by pricing their products lower because they do not have to include the
initial costs of research and invention in their pricing schemes).
146 See id. at 935 (“[A]ccessibility or excludability conditions are generally contingent upon
human decisions about how to manage the underlying resource.”).
147 See id. at 935, 994–95, 994 n.291. Part of the patent grant is increasing public knowl-
edge by complete disclosure of the patented invention, though some limited disclosure is
inherently necessary to use or sell the invention or the products of the invention. See supra
Part III.B.
148 See supra Part II.B (discussing the notice function of the patent grant).
149 See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
150 See supra Part II.B (discussing the exclusivity problems of the patent grant such as
suppression and patent “trolls”).
151 See Chander & Sunder, supra note 136, at 1340 (“[I]nnovation captured as private
property depends upon the existence of a rich public domain.”) (emphasis in original).
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industry and inventors generally want to protect their intellectual property
rights.152 Decisions on protection will depend on how the owners best be-
lieve their intellectual property resources can best be exploited.153 Large
companies with a large environmental footprint may want to keep and ex-
ploit their intellectual property through exclusivity, which runs counter
to a commons approach.
In conclusion, the commons approach would increase access and
disclosure of green inventions if the inventors of the technology decide to
both dedicate and disclose their inventions to the public domain. The fail-
ure of a commons approach to address the issue of initial research and
implementation costs, coupled with the desire of many companies to pro-
tect their intellectual property through exclusivity, means that the com-
mons approach likely will not succeed in addressing the major obstacles
to green innovation.
B. Trade Secret
The next idea that might address problems of industry and patent
law in promoting green innovation is the use of trade secrets. Trade secret
laws are state laws that “provide[ ] certain legal protection against mis-
appropriation of business information that is not commonly known.”154
Some states have codified their trade secret common law.155 Trade secrets
can include business processes or products, as well as confidential cus-
tomer lists or business plans.156 Trade secrets might be required to confer
a competitive advantage and the companies may be required to attempt
to maintain the secrecy of the information.157 As noted in the last part, this
note is concerned with the technical intellectual property aspect of trade
secret law.
The note again turns to the different problems with encouraging
green innovation in industry and how those problems relate to intellectual
152 See Gene Quinn, Green Tech Companies Protest Patent Reform Legislation,
IPWATCHDOG,(March 9, 2009, 9:41 PM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2009/03/09/green-tech
-companies-protest-patent-reform-legislation/id=2163/ (“This approach to tie the future of
green technology to a strong patent system that does not reward the infringer and instead
rewards innovation could well be a turning point in the debate.”).
153 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
154 Mandel, supra note 19, at 53.
155 Gollin, supra note 6, at 199–200.
156 See id. at 199 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939)).
157 See id. at 199–200 (“Without this requirement [for secrecy], a potential user of the
technology might have great difficulty in ascertaining what information may be subject to
a proper claim of trade secrecy.”).
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property and patent law. Trade secrets can reduce transaction costs, but
companies may still need to protect investment through litigation.158 In
looking at the cost incentives of trade secrets, it is important to distinguish
between environmental polluters and “firms whose primary business is de-
veloping products or processes to reduce environmental degradation. . . .”159
Trade secrets may not improve operation costs for environmental degraders
because innovation generally increases those costs, and the companies
may want competitors to also implement the innovations “to level the
operations-cost playing field.”160 Environmental innovators will not use
trade secrets because their object is to sell those innovations.161 Conse-
quently, trade secrets are not likely to increase the incentives for environ-
mental innovation.
The next issue that trade secrets must address with environmental
innovation are the problems with disclosure and exclusivity. Trade secrets
must not be commonly known,162 so companies must limit access to infor-
mation on the technology or process through internal confidentiality, as
well as with third-party “vendors, customers, and service providers.”163
Trade secrets inherently run counter to mass implementation of efficient
raw material use, energy saving, and waste reduction across competitors
and industries because there can be no disclosure while still maintaining
the trade secret.164 Further, the broad disclosure requirements by some
environmental regulations may prevent the use of trade secrets.165 Those
environmental regulations may not require disclosure of the trade secrets
themselves, but the disclosure must be “relate[d] to processes, equipment,
and formulas at the heart of a company’s competitive position.”166 Trade
secrets are hard to keep when the secret relates to toxic or hazardous sub-
stances, which may present a perverse incentive for use of at least non-
hazardous substances, if not more green technology.167 Even if the company
158 See id. at 200–01. In order to protect a trade secret, there can be criminal or civil actions.
Id. at 200 (“There has been debate over whether trade secrets are protected primarily under
a theory of misappropriation or as property.”).
159 Mandel, supra note 19, at 53.
160 Id. at 53–54.
161 Id. at 53.
162 Id.
163 See Gollin, supra note 6, at 202.
164 See supra notes 154–57 and accompanying text.
165 Gollin, supra note 6, at 203.
166 Id. (“To alleviate the legitimate concern of industry that such disclosure may damage
competitive advantage, and encourage full disclosure, most environmental statutes couple
the duty to disclose with provisions protecting trade secrets.”).
167 Id. at 204.
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can manage to protect its trade secrets from disclosure with regard to en-
vironmental regulations, “[t]he risk of trade secret disclosure is highest
in a civil or criminal enforcement proceeding.”168 For all of these reasons
trade secrets are unlikely to be used to promote disclosure or overcome
issues with the exclusivity of patents.
In conclusion, the lack of disclosure and the inherent exclusivity of
trade secrets harms the necessity for mass implementation of green tech-
nology to encourage innovation. Trade secrets may not influence the cost
analysis from either a patent or research and implementation approach.
Trade secrets may be desirable for the individual company, but they will
not encourage green innovation where patent protection fails.
C. Patent Pools
The next intellectual property idea that might help to address the
issues with patent law promoting green industrial innovation is patent
pools. A patent pool is created when a group of companies that hold compli-
mentary patents pool those patents together under a single license and
then determine how to divide the proceeds between the members of the
group.169 Licensees that pay the fee are then able to practice the group of
patents without the threat of infringement.170 Patent pools are not a new
intellectual property idea.171 In 1856, instead of suing over patents, a
group of manufacturers “formed the Sewing Machine Combination to mass
produce sewing machines.”172 More recently, the International Organization
for Standardization (“ISO”) formed the MPEG-2 patent pool with twenty
seven patents necessary for compliance with the MPEG-2 standard for
audio and video.173 Patent pools can be particularly useful when dealing
with complicated technical issues because patents often overlap, thus
preventing one patent from being practiced because it would infringe on
another patent.174 For this reason patent pools work well with technologies
168 Id. at 208.
169 See Sovacool, supra note 8, at 433.
170 See Showalter & Kurth, supra note 21, at 22 (“A single entity provides the licenses, in
most instances, and those previously caught in the sticky wicket of patents may now enter
the market, for a fee.”).
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id. (“The owners of these patents combined their patents into a portfolio and selected a
licensing administrator to grant licenses under the portfolio, collect royalties, and distribute
them to the patent holders. Other patent holders have created similar types of pools to
license other standardized technologies, such as DVD-Video and DVD-ROM.”).
174 See id. A patent pool may even be necessary here to prevent patent blocking. See id.
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that require interoperability, which “can lead to more widely implemented
standards and more efficient licensing markets.”175 Patent pools work most
efficiently when only the necessary patents to implement the technology
or service are included in the pool.176 Companies should donate “the nec-
essary patented technology to the patent pool for innovation to occur, not
just the technology that has been a commercial dead end.”177 If patents
that are unnecessary to innovation are included in the pool, the patentees
may be able to have an undue influence and adversely affect the cost of
those licenses.178
The first issue that patent pools must address about problems of
encouraging green innovation through patent law is the issue of cost.
Patent pools can reduce transaction cost by spreading risk between com-
panies and reducing duplicative research costs.179 Even if patent pools do
reduce transaction cost through cooperation, there can be cost problems
like coordination costs and anti-trust issues.180 Members can decide to
“drop out, leave, change corporate strategy, or become acquired by a firm
that no longer wants to continue collaboration.”181 Although patent pools
may reduce duplicative costs, the duplicative research may also be consid-
ered a necessary safety net against joint projects that are not successful.182
Anti-trust issues arise when competitors cooperate to set licensing fees.183
“[P]atent pools are particularly susceptible to anti-competitive violations
such as price fixing, output restrictions among competitors to drive up prod-
uct prices, and collusion.”184 Patent pools are still associated with licensing
costs and royalties, so they may decrease licensing costs by “providing one-
stop access.”185 However, they could also increase licensing costs due to
anti-trust price fixing or by the inclusion of bad patents in the pool.186
175 Showalter & Kurth, supra note 21, at 22.
176 See Vanessa Lancaster & Jason Kasting, Patent Pool Particulars: Encouraging
Innovation by Reducing Patent Barriers, IPHANDBOOK BLOG (Apr. 2, 2009, 3:47PM),
http://blog.iphandbook.org/?p=248 (“The negotiation of patent pools often fail because the
patent holders do not have aligned interests or because advances in the technology occur
at a fast pace and no clear platform, or standards, have emerged.”).
177 Id.
178 See id.
179 See Sovacool, supra note 8, at 431.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 See id.
183 Id.
184 Lancaster & Kasting, supra note 176.
185 See Showalter & Kurth, supra note 21.
186 See id.
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Additionally, pools may help to prevent royalty stacking, “which occurs
when a product is subject to a number of separate royalty obligations.”187
Ultimately, the organizational structure and the implementation of the
pool will largely influence the effect it has on the transaction costs asso-
ciated with licensing and enforcing green patents.188
Patent pools also need to address the issue of exclusivity and dis-
closure that hampers green innovation through patent law. Pools can help
address patent blocking,189 which helps consumers get innovative prod-
ucts.190 Effective patent pools establish collaboration, which can affect the
“rapid development” of innovative technology.191 The cooperation required
for patent pools runs counter to the desire for exclusivity,192 but may be
necessary for implementation because of issues like patent blocking.193
Disclosure and use of innovative patents is increased through patent pools,
but effective patent pools are limited in scope and industry, which may
limit the use and effect of those innovations.194
To summarize, patent pools are a useful step in the right direction
to reduce transaction costs and further implement green innovation if they
are structured properly. Collaboration is good for solving large scale envi-
ronmental issues by reducing the transaction costs of exclusivity in com-
plicated technical areas. Patent pools work within the protection of the
patent system, so innovators will retain some protection of their inven-
tions. Patent pools do not fully address the issues with green innovation
and patent law because they do not necessarily reduce licensing costs or
increase mass use of green technology except within participants in the
pool. This note will now turn to an alternative group pooling theory called
Eco-Patent Commons.
187 Id.
188 See id.
189 Sovacool, supra note 8, at 433.
190 See Narinder Banait & Robert Yamasaki, PATENT POOLS IN LIFE SCIENCES, FENWICK
& WEST LLP 1, 1–2 (2010), http://www.fenwick.com/docstore/Publications/IP/Patent_Pools
.pdf. Success of the pool will depend on the cooperation of the holders of the overlapping
patents. See generally Showalter & Kurth, supra note 21.
191 See Lancaster & Kasting, supra note 176.
192 See Sovacool, supra note 8, at 439 (“Small and large energy firms alike may be less
willing to participate in collaborative agreements or patent pools since such acts could
be viewed as undermining the financial gains to be made from exclusivity.”).
193 See id. at 433.
194 See Seidenberg, supra note 21, at 26 (“In a more discrete area, like pharmaceuticals or
biotechnology, patent pools and patent licensing can be pretty effective, but where so many
different areas are involved, there may not be the same kind of knowledge or familiarity
with different fields . . . .”).
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D. Eco-Patent Commons
The final intellectual property idea that this note will examine is
a patent group called the Eco-Patent Commons (“EPC”). The Eco-Patent
Commons was formed in January 2008, by IBM, Nokia, Pitney Bowes and
Sony.195 The EPC is similar to the Creative Commons, which is a copyright
project aimed at offering licenses that disclaim some copyright protection
while reserving some of those protections.196 Instead of copyright material,
the EPC offers environmentally useful patents without royalties to any-
one who wishes to use them.197 The EPC is an extension of the patent pool
idea, except there is no licensing fee.198 A company only needs to pledge one
patent in order to become a member of the EPC.199 The patentee company
determines whether patents are eligible for the EPC by comparing the
patent to a list of International Patent Classifications.200 If the patent falls
under one of the categories, the patentee then submits a written nomina-
tion that details the “environmental benefits of the claimed invention.”201
The patents are available online, classified by subject, and searchable,
hosted by the World Business Council for Sustainable Development
(“WBCSD”).202 Since the inception of the EPC, other companies like Bosch,
Dow, DuPont, Fuji-Xerox, Ricoh, Taisei and Xerox have joined the group,
bringing the total number of companies pledging patents to eleven.203
195 Eco-Patent Commons, WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., http://www.wbcsd
.org/web/epc/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2011); see also Press Release, IBM, Corporations Go
Public With Eco-Friendly Patents (Jan. 14, 2008) available at http://www-03.ibm.com/
press/us/en/pressrelease/23280.wss.
196 See Adrienne K. Goss, Codifying a Commons: Copyright, Copyleft, and the Creative
Commons Project, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 963, 964 (2007) (“Essentially, users of these types
of licenses are reframing their ‘property right’ protected by federal law into a contract right
ordered by the terms of the agreement.”). This is different than a patent commons. Arnaud
Le Hors, The Eco-Patent Commons Has Momentum, ARNAUD’S OPEN BLOG (Mar. 23, 2009),
http://lehors.wordpress.com/2009/03/23/the-eco-patent-commons-has-momentum/.
197 ECO-PATENT COMMONS: A LEADERSHIP OPPORTUNITY, supra note 22, at 1, 2, 5.
198 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
199 ECO-PATENT COMMONS: A LEADERSHIP OPPORTUNITY, supra note 22, at 2.
200 Id. at 5. The list can be found at Eco-Patent Commons Classification List March
2009, WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., http://www.wbcsd.org/web/projects/
ecopatent/IPC-codes-March2009.pdf (click “Eco-patent classification list” link) (last updated
Mar. 11, 2009).
201 Eco-Patent Commons: Joining or Submitting Additional Patents to the Commons,
WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., 3 (Sept. 17, 2010). http://www.wbcsd.org/
web/projects/ecopatent/EcoPatentGroundRules.pdf (click “How to join the Eco-patent
Commons” link).
202 See ECO-PATENT COMMONS: A LEADERSHIP OPPORTUNITY, supra note 22, at 2.
203 See WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., supra note 195.
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The stated purpose of the EPC is “to help enable the world com-
munity to reduce waste, pollution, global warming and energy demands”
by making patents available without royalties or licensing costs.204 The
EPC gives examples of environmental benefits of patents such as “energy
conservation or efficiency, pollution prevention (source reduction, waste
reduction), use of environmentally preferable materials or substances,
materials reduction [and] increased recyclability.”205 One example of an
environmentally beneficial patent is a packing patent donated by IBM.206
IBM developed a method of protecting semiconductor components without
using Styrofoam peanuts, but did not “want to exploit the patent itself be-
cause the company was not in the packaging business.”207 IBM weighed the
cost and benefit of the patent and instead decided “it would be more profit-
able to donate the patent than to license it.”208 Included in this analysis
was the fact that a packaging company would normally have to license
the patent, which would increase the cost to IBM as a consumer of the
licensed packaging.209 IBM weighed the same factors discussed earlier in
the note, and also factored in the effect of the patent to the environment
to conclude that it should be donated to the EPC.210
EPC works similarly to the aforementioned Creative Commons
because donator patentees sign a covenant not to assert patents against
users of that patent, but only for their environmentally beneficial uses.211
The covenant is subject to a defensive termination provision, which allows
a member of the Commons to terminate the non-assert agreement against
another member if the party asserts an unpledged, classified, and environ-
mentally beneficial patent against the member, or against a non-member
if the non-member asserts any infringement claim against the member.212
There is no requirement that a company pledge anything specific, they
may keep any patent they desire, and there is no requirement that the
204 See ECO-PATENT COMMONS: A LEADERSHIP OPPORTUNITY, supra note 22, at 2.
205 Id. at 3.
206 See Seidenberg, supra note 21, at 26.
207 See id.
208 See id.
209 See id.
210 See id.
211 See ECO-PATENT COMMONS: A LEADERSHIP OPPORTUNITY, supra note 22, at 2; see also
Seidenberg, supra note 21, at 26 (“Some inventions that have been donated have mainline
uses, not just ecological uses. A donor can continue to have exclusive use of the patent for
non-ecological purposes and still get the benefit of donating it. It’s one of those rare times
when you can have your cake and eat it too.”).
212 See Eco-Patent Commons: Joining or Submitting Additional Patents to the Commons,
supra note 201, at 4–5.
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company support the donated patents, except to maintain the patent fees
required by the USPTO.213 Although companies might just place their
patented technology in the public domain, they may also want to maintain
rights like those associated with the “defensive termination clause” of the
EPC.214 If the donor does let the patent lapse or the patent becomes unen-
forceable, if for instance it is held invalid, then the holder must notify the
EPC.215 Thus, the EPC allows a company to evaluate their patent portfolio
to best suit their own needs while keeping in mind the benefit that intel-
lectual property has for the environment.
There are issues with the EPC. The first issue is that because it is
new, it is difficult to measure its effect.216 While the use of donated patents
is free and the website is searchable, there is no method to track actual
use of the donated patents.217 Even if the patent is free to use, there is no
guarantee that other patents will not block the use of that technology.218
There is also a question about the scope and effect of the EPC.
Currently, the involvement by industry has been limited mostly to tech-
nology companies,219 and the absence of a big energy company, which
would be analogous to IBM as a big technology company, worries some
commentators.220 The lack of support from the energy sector, coupled with
the concern for a lack of mass implementation, leads to questions about the
scope and the effect of the EPC.221 Some companies may be reluctant to join
the EPC.222 There is also a question of the value of the granted technology
213 See ECO-PATENT COMMONS: A LEADERSHIP OPPORTUNITY, supra note 22, at 2, 5, 6.
214 See id. at 6.
215 See id.
216 See Jo Bowman, The Eco-Patent Commons: Caring Through Sharing, WIPO MAG., June
2009, at 11–12, available at http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2009/03/article_0004
.html. The Energy Manager of the WBCSD “cautions observers to expect long-term results
from the program rather than a sudden manufacturing revolution.” Id. at 12.
217 See id. Because there is no requirement of a user to register with the EPC, there is no
way to track use of the actual technology. See id.
218 See Steven Seidenberg, Use With Care, INSIDE COUNSEL, April 2009, at 26. This is
similar to the problem with needing all of the necessary patents to practice a technology
in a patent pool.
219 See Bowman, supra note 216, at 12.
220 See Krishna Ravi Srinivas, Sink or Swim: Eco-Patent Commons and the Transfer of
Environmentally Sustainable Technologies, 2 BRIDGES TRADE BIORES TRADE & ENV’T
REV. 16, 16 (2008), available at http://ictsd.net/i/news/bioresreview/12098/ (“But in [sic]
case of Eco-Patent Commons the absence of an ‘IBM’ in the energy, environment or
transport sector is a major drawback.”).
221 See id. (“However, unless the patent is applied in many countries it is difficult to assess
its total environmental impact.”).
222 See Le Hors, supra note 196. Although eleven companies have donated patents and the
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because of the delays associated with obtaining a patent.223 The concerns
about the effect of the EPC are related to the novelty of the idea, so this
note will turn to conceptual arguments for the EPC with regard to problems
of incentivizing green innovation by industry through the patent system.
IV. THE ARGUMENT FOR THE ECO-PATENT COMMONS
The EPC is a useful new idea in intellectual property that will help
to address some of the issues with incentivizing green innovation through
the patent system. This note now turns to the argument for the Eco-Patent
Commons addressing many of the issues associated with incentivizing
green innovation.
The first issue that the EPC helps to address is the cost issue in-
herent in the patent system. The EPC does not need to address the cost
of the first researcher and implementer recovering their investment be-
cause the EPC is a donation of already obtained patents.224 The EPC will
be more advantageous to licensee-users than patent pools because the use
is free, so use will help to decrease the costs of research, implementation,
or licensing the green technology.225 The EPC will help with addressing the
cost of already obtained patents when the donating companies recognize
the nature of the sunk cost of patents with no known use, or when they
determine that the patents have more utility when donated to the EPC.226
A patentee may not even be able to use or efficiently utilize the protection
of their own patent, which is another factor in the calculation of keeping
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or donating a patent to the EPC.227 The EPC is a tool for industrial com-
panies to use in deciding the best way to utilize a patent when they have
already spent time and money to obtain that patent. The EPC can help
to influence the problem of cost externalities, because it indicates a shift
in the idea of responsibility for those externalities that may affect that
problem indirectly.228
The EPC also works within the current system of patent disclo-
sure and exclusion to promote cooperation and mutual benefit rather than
simply benefit to the inventor.229 The donator-holder of the patent main-
tains some contractual rights in the EPC through the defensive termination
clause.230 The EPC helps to avoid the free rider problem associated with
normal commons by ensuring that the patents are only used for the mutual
benefit of the environment and not for other non-environmental uses.231
The EPC encourages companies to avoid suppression of patents when the
patent holder has no use for their patent because of the environmentally
beneficial nature of the patent.232 The EPC also avoids the lack of protec-
tion and encouragement of secrecy or non-disclosure from commons and
trade secrets respectively.233 Working within the patent system rather
than outside the system has benefits to the inventor with patents of little
or unknown utility.
The last and most important way that the EPC works to promote
environmental innovation through the patent system is by sharing knowl-
edge to anyone interested and fostering cooperation within and across
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industries. Some of the stated goals of the EPC are promoting disclosure
to accelerate green innovation as well as “promot[ing] and encourag[ing]
cooperation and collaboration between businesses that pledge patents and
potential users to foster further joint innovations and the advancement and
development of solutions that benefit the environment.”234 In exchange for
donating towards this goal, the online presence of the EPC allows busi-
nesses to gain recognition for their effort towards “sustainable develop-
ment.”235 The EPC also encourages cooperation beyond industry boundaries,
a limitation of patent pooling.236 Cooperation and collaboration are needed
to have a wide range effect on the environment through green innovation.237
The EPC also encourages disclosure beyond the normal patent filing system
through the detail of disclosure on their website.238 The patents are located
in a searchable database,239 the WBCSD promotes the EPC on the web and
elsewhere,240 and the EPC requests a summary of the environmental bene-
fits of the patent from the patentee.241 This combination of disclosure with
non-enforcement helps to address the issue of unclear patent disclosure.242
The non-enforcement and free use of the patent, coupled with possible
collaboration between the user and the donor would help alleviate the
problem of unclear property rights of the inventor.243
It is worth noting some of the shortcomings of the EPC. Without
some other mechanism of self-reporting or publicity it will be difficult to
measure the effect of the EPC because of the lack of a reporting system
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as a requirement of use.244 The EPC may be limited in effect because
companies may be reluctant to donate patents that represent significant
monetary value,245 or because there is no big energy representative cur-
rently involved in the EPC.246 The EPC will not address the implementation
costs to original inventors.247 The last significant complaint about the EPC
is that the donated technology may not have much use because of the
significant delays inherent in obtaining a patent.248 Most of the complaints
about the EPC relate to its relative novelty and only time will dictate
whether there is a pronounced effect on green innovation because of the
Eco-Patent Commons.
CONCLUSION
Industry faces many challenges in fostering green innovation
because of its unique position as a cause and solution to environmental
problems. Patent law is aimed at fostering innovation through the bargain
of monopoly for disclosure, but it is plagued with similar issues of trans-
action costs, problems with the exclusivity of the patent monopoly, and
problems with the disclosure function of patents. The Eco-Patent Commons
is the best idea of the alternative forms of intellectual property examined
in this note for addressing these issues. The EPC works to promote environ-
mental innovation through disclosure and collaboration after the cost of
researching an invention and obtaining the patent has taken place. While
the novelty of the EPC results in some concerns, the EPC helps to address
problems with patent disclosure, to influence industrial attitudes about the
external nature of environmental concerns, and to encourage patentees
to donate rather than suppress patents with no known use. The EPC pro-
motes innovation through disclosure and collaboration, all within the
patent system. The Eco-Patent Commons is a useful tool in the intellectual
property portfolio of any industrial entity that seeks to promote environ-
mental innovation through donation, disclosure, collaboration, and wide
breadth of use.
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